Legislatures and the Budget Process The Myth of Fiscal Control

'Given the importance of the topic, it is a surprise that there is so little truly comparative work on the role of legislatures in budgeting. This book admirably fills this gap in the literature. It combines quantitative approaches with careful case studies that delve into the causal mechanisms at work. We learn that the legislature's ability to amend the budget does change budgetary outcomes. At the same time, the careful case study evidence indicates that quantitative scholars need to pay more attention to the institutional details of how processes like 'top-down budgeting' are introduced and implemented. Scholars and policymakers alike interested in executive legislative relations, institutional design, and budgeting should pay close attention to this book.'

Mark Hallerberg, Professor of Public Management and Political Economy, Hertie School of Governance, Germany

'In this insightful book, Joachim Wehner combines systematic cross-national analysis and case studies to assess the budgetary role and predicament of modern legislatures. Armed with growing independence from government, national legislatures are more active in amending the budget, but must also be more disciplined in fiscal policy. This book offers practical guidance, based on the experiences of innovative legislatures, on how to balance these cross pressures.'

Allen Schick, Professor of Political Science, University of Maryland, USA

'This book makes an important additionto previous work, especially with regard to the relationship between the power of a legislature and public spending. It should be of real value to legislatures and governments alike as fiscal constraints gain more prominence in the years ahead.'

Barry Anderson, Former Head of the Budgeting and Public Expenditures Division, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, France