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Produktbild: The Evolution of Public Pension Schemes

The Evolution of Public Pension Schemes

Aus der Reihe Microeconomic Studies

Fr. 137.00

inkl. gesetzl. MwSt., Versandkostenfrei

Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Taschenbuch

Erscheinungsdatum

09.03.2012

Verlag

Springer Berlin

Seitenzahl

287

Maße (L/B/H)

24.4/17/1.7 cm

Gewicht

527 g

Auflage

Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1988

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-3-642-45655-8

Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Taschenbuch

Erscheinungsdatum

09.03.2012

Verlag

Springer Berlin

Seitenzahl

287

Maße (L/B/H)

24.4/17/1.7 cm

Gewicht

527 g

Auflage

Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1988

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-3-642-45655-8

Herstelleradresse

Springer-Verlag KG
Sachsenplatz 4-6
1201 Wien
AT

Email: ProductSafety@springernature.com

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  • Produktbild: The Evolution of Public Pension Schemes
  • 1 Introduction.- 1.1 An introduction to the problem.- 1.2 Outline of the book.- 2 The History of Transfer Payments for the Old.- 2.1 Introduction.- 2.2 The history of old-age transfers before government intervention.- 2.2.1 Introduction.- 2.2.2 Agricultural societies as insurance systems.- 2.2.3 The industrial revolution: breakdown of voluntary transfer systems.- 2.2.4 Social assistance during the industrial revolution.- 2.2.5 General factors explaining the rise of public pension schemes.- 2.3 The history of three public pension plans compared.- 2.3.1 Introduction.- 2.3.2 Germany.- 2.3.3 The Netherlands.- 2.3.4 The United States of America (US).- 2.3.5 The history of the schemes compared.- 2.4 What can we learn from history?.- 2.5 Summary.- 3 The Case for Government Intervention.- 3.1 Introduction.- 3.2 Market failure.- 3.3 Paternalism.- 3.4 Redistribution.- 3.4.1 Introduction.- 3.4.2 Intragenerational redistribution.- 3.4.3 Intergenerational redistribution.- 3.5 Administrative efficiency.- 3.6 Political and economic arguments compared.- 3.7 Summary.- 4 The Choice of Financing Method: Economic Motives.- 4.1 Introduction.- 4.2 Economic considerations.- 4.3 The generalized Aaron-condition.- 4.4 Conversion policies.- 4.4.1 Introduction.- 4.4.2 Conversion policy in a closed economy.- 4.4.3 Conversion policies in a small open economy.- 4.4.4 Qualifications.- 4.5 Summary.- 5 The Choice of Financing Method: Political Motives.- 5.1 Introduction.- 5.2 Decision-making in a direct democracy.- 5.3 A simple decision-making model.- 5.3.1 Introduction.- 5.3.2 Decision-making on the financing system.- 5.3.3 Decision-making on the benefit level.- 5.4 An application to the Netherlands.- 5.5 Generalizations and other models.- 5.5.1 Introduction.- 5.5.2 Imperfections of the capital market.- 5.5.3 Demand for other public goods.- 5.5.4 Hu’s model of uncertainty.- 5.5.5 Decision-making as a dynamic game between generations.- 5.6 Summary.- 6 Tax-Transfer View, Altruism and Political Power.- 6.1 Introduction.- 6.2 The tax-transfer versus the insurance vision.- 6.3 Altruism and the public pension scheme.- 6.3.1 Introduction.- 6.3.2 The premium rate.- 6.3.3 The Aaron-condition.- 6.3.4 The steady-state.- 6.3.5 Concluding remarks.- 6.4 Collective decision-making and public pensions.- 6.4.1 Introduction.- 6.4.2 Public pensions in a representative democracy.- 6.4.3 A model of representative democracy.- 6.5 Altruism and imperfect capital markets.- 6.5.1 Introduction.- 6.5.2 The premium rate.- 6.5.3 The steady-state.- 6.6 Summary.- Appendix 6A Altruism and the Aaron-condition (the non-cooperative case).- Appendix 6B Stackelberg-behavior and future positive savings.- 7 Uncertainty and Redistribution.- 7.1 Introduction.- 7.2 Financing method and redistribution.- 7.2.1 The mechanism of redistribution.- 7.2.2 The independence of financing method and redistribution.- 7.3 Risk aversion and public pension plans.- 7.3.1 Introduction.- 7.3.2 Intragenerational redistribution.- 7.3.3 Intergenerational redistribution.- 7.3.4 Fixed-benefit rate versus fixed-premium rate.- 7.3.5 Constitutional and parliamentary decision-making.- 7.4 Summary.- Appendix 7A Redistribution and financing method: Z generations.- Appendix 7B Intragenerational redistribution.- Appendix 7C Intergenerational redistribution.- 8 The Rise and Evolution of Payg-Systems.- 8.1 Introduction.- 8.2 Survey of models.- 8.3 A decision-making model with uncertainty and constant Aaron-variable.- 8.3.1 Introduction.- 8.3.2 Expectations with regard to the behavior of future generations.- 8.3.3 Decision-making with uncertainty about future behavior.- 8.3.4 Convergence to the steady-state.- 8.4 Public pension plans under a non-constant Aaron-variable.- 8.4.1 Introduction.- 8.4.2 Model I: ‘altruism by habit’ as an explanatory variable.- 8.4.3 Model II: altruism or political power as explanatory variables.- 8.5 The future of the PAYG-system.- 8.5.1 Introduction.- 8.5.2 Pessimistic expectations.- 8.5.3 Optimistic expectations.- 8.5.4 Concluding remarks.- 8.6 Discussion and summary.- 9 Public Pensions in a Small Open Economy.- 9.1 Introduction.- 9.2 The model.- 9.3 A simulation: consumers are certain of the future of the PAYG-scheme.- 9.4 Conversion policies.- 9.5 Decision-making under uncertainty.- 9.6 Summary.- 10 An Evaluation.- 10.1 Introduction.- 10.2 The facts to be explained.- 10.3 Explanations offered in the literature on public pension schemes.- 10.4 The model used.- 10.5 The results obtained.- 10.6 Will PAYG-financed public pension schemes continue to exist?.- Notes.- References.- Author Index.- List of Symbols.