• Produktbild: Divided Sovereignty
  • Produktbild: Divided Sovereignty

Divided Sovereignty International Institutions and the Limits of State Authority

Fr. 55.90

inkl. gesetzl. MwSt., Versandkostenfrei


Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Taschenbuch

Erscheinungsdatum

01.07.2017

Verlag

Oxford University Press

Seitenzahl

240

Maße (L/B/H)

23.4/15.6/1.4 cm

Gewicht

340 g

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-0-19-069217-9

Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Taschenbuch

Erscheinungsdatum

01.07.2017

Verlag

Oxford University Press

Seitenzahl

240

Maße (L/B/H)

23.4/15.6/1.4 cm

Gewicht

340 g

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-0-19-069217-9

Herstelleradresse

Libri GmbH
Europaallee 1
36244 Bad Hersfeld
DE

Email: gpsr@libri.de

Noch keine Bewertungen vorhanden

Verfassen Sie die erste Bewertung zu diesem Artikel

Helfen Sie anderen Kundinnen und Kunden durch Ihre Meinung.

Kundinnen und Kunden meinen

Bewertungen (0)

  • Produktbild: Divided Sovereignty
  • Produktbild: Divided Sovereignty
    • Introduction

    • 1. Why Divided Sovereignty?

    • 2. Method and Justification

    • 3. Outline of the Book

    • Chapter 1 Sovereignty, the Social Contract, and the Incompleteness of the State System

    • 1. The Institutions of the Social Contract

    • 2. On Sovereignty and Delegation of Authority

    • 3. Problems of Institutional Design

    • 4. Conceptual and practical Hurdles to Divided Sovereignty

    • 5. Conclusion

    • Chapter 2 Divided Sovereignty: the Principal-Agent Model

    • 1. Sovereignty Limiting Norms and their Current Effects

    • 2. Divided Sovereignty: The Principal-Agent Model

    • 2.1 The Origins of the Model

    • 2.2 The Principle-Agent Model for International Institutions

    • 2.3 Delegation

    • 2.4 The Role of Consent

    • 3. Agency Costs at the International Level

    • 4. Why Use Principal-Agent Theory?

    • 5. Conclusion

    • Chapter 3 Domestic and International Implications: Slavery, Genocide and Civil War

    • 1. The Scope and Limits of International Authority

    • 2. Constitutional Interpretation and Change

    • 3. Slavery

    • 4. Genocide

    • 5. Civil Wars and Failed States

    • 6. Conclusion

    • Chapter 4 Theories and Institutional Facts

    • 1. One Step Theorizing: Cosmopolitan Justice

    • 2. Two Step Theorizing: The Case of Humanitarian Intervention

    • 3. Objections

    • 4. Conclusion

    • Chapter 5 Romanticizing Institutions

    • 1. Cosmopolitan Global Democracy

    • 2. Rule of Law Experiments

    • 3. Rule of Law for Global Democracy

    • 4. Institutional Assumptions and Bureaucratic Pathologies

    • 5. Conclusion

    • Chapter 6 Institutional Pluralism

    • 1. Institutions in International Criminal Law

    • 2. Fragmentation and Conflict

    • 3. The Benefits of a Pluralist System

    • 4. Complex Social Orders

    • 5. A Hobbesian Challenge

    • 6. Conclusion

    • Chapter 7 The Possibility of Rule-Governed Behavior in International Politics

    • 1. Cooperation under Anarchy

    • 2. Assumptions and Implications of International Relations Theorizing

    • 3. Self-Preservation as the Dominant State Preference

    • 4. The Possibility of a Rule-Governed Order

    • Conclusion