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Produktbild: Global Constitutionalism & Its

Global Constitutionalism & Its Constitutional La

Aus der Reihe European Academy of Legal Theo

Fr. 62.90

inkl. gesetzl. MwSt., Versandkostenfrei

Produktdetails

Einband

Taschenbuch

Erscheinungsdatum

01.10.2020

Herausgeber

Martin Belov + weitere

Verlag

Hart Publishing

Seitenzahl

232

Maße (L/B)

23.4/15.6 cm

Gewicht

331 g

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-1-5099-4118-6

Produktdetails

Einband

Taschenbuch

Erscheinungsdatum

01.10.2020

Herausgeber

Verlag

Hart Publishing

Seitenzahl

232

Maße (L/B)

23.4/15.6 cm

Gewicht

331 g

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-1-5099-4118-6

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Die Leseprobe wird geladen.
  • Produktbild: Global Constitutionalism & Its
  • Part I. General Constitutional Theory of Global Constitutionalism 1. Global Constitutionalism and Normative Hierarchies Jean-Bernard Auby I. The Basic Problem: The Disorder Created by the Multiplication and Dispersion of Legal Producers and of Places of Production of Law in the Global Space II. Theories of Global Constitutionalism as Efforts to Instil some Order and Values into the Normative Disorder of Legal Globalisation III. The Problem of Normative Hierarchies in Legal Globalisation IV. Global Constitutionalism and Links between Legal Orders V. Global Constitutionalism and Normative Arrangements VI. Global Constitutionalism and Dissemination of the Rule of Law’s Fundamental Principles VII. Conclusion: Necessity and Limits of Global Constitutionalism 2. The Challenges to Westphalian Constitutional Geometry in the Age of Supranational Constitutionalism, Global Governance and Information Revolution Martin Belov I. Taking Constitutional Geometry Seriously II. Geometrical Explanatory Paradigms in Westphalian Constitutional Law III. Post-Westphalian Challenges of Supranational Constitutionalism, Global Governance and Information Revolution to the Constitutional Geometry of Westphalian Constitutional Law IV. Conclusion 3. Overcoming False Dichotomies: Constitutionalism and Pluralism in European and International Studies Giuseppe Martinico I. Aims and Structure II. Constitutionalism According to Krisch III. Questioning this Reconstruction IV. Italian Constitutionalism between Resistance and Openness V. The Italian Constituent Process and its Relevance VI. External Openness VII. Final Remarks Part II. Limits to Global Constitutionalism 4. Counter-developments to Global Constitutionalism Konrad Lachmayer I. The Road Towards Constitutional Authoritarianism II. The Threats to Global Constitutionalism III. Between Societal and Civic Constitutionalism 5. Romanian Tendential Constitutionalism and the Limits of European Constitutional Culture Manuel Gutan I. Failure of the European Model of Civic Constitutionalism II. The European Constitutional Convergence and the Limits of the European Constitutional Transplant III. Factors Explaining the Poor Romanian Score in Endorsing Civic Constitutionalism IV. Romanian Tendential Constitutionalism V. Conclusions Part III. Issues of European Supranational Constitutionalism 6. The Limits of Sovereignty Pooling: Lessons from Europe Balázs Fekete I. An Evergreen Problem Re-exposed II. Keohane’s Idea of Pooled Sovereignty III. Sovereignty Pooling in EU Constitutional Law IV. The Nightfall of Sovereignty Pooling in Europe? 7. EU Agencies in the Internal Market: A Constitutional Challenge for EU Law Marta Simoncini I. Introduction II. EU Agencies in the Complex Nature of the EU Integration Process III. The Constitutional Value of the Meroni Doctrine IV. The Constitutional Challenges to EU Agencies V. Final Remarks