Part I. Introduction - Ambitions and Comparison
I. Ambitions
II. Why Hungary and Poland
III. Insight into the book
Part II. Terms - Constitutionalism, illiberal(ism), and constitutional democracy
I. Constitutionalism in the term "illiberal constitutionalism"
II. Illiberal(ism)
III. Constitutional democracy
Part III. Identity - Unbalanced constitutional identity: emotions and values
I. Historical and emotional trajectory
II. Post-communist past and beyond
III. Possible root cause: the combination of the above
Part IV. Limits - Comparative perspective
I. The Emergence of llliberal Constitutionalism
II. A comparative perspective - looking for constraints
III. Contextualization: the European Rule of Law as a constraint on public power
Part V. Limits - Constraints in constitutional design and identity
I. Illiberal legality
II. Illiberal Democracy
III. Illiberalization of Human Rights
Part VI. Stability - How "illiberal limits" emerge and work
I. Capturing constitutions and constitutionalism, and creating invisible constitution
II. Illiberal judicialization of politics
III. Pushing the limits and bouncing back
IV. Defeating exit strategies from the hollowed-out constitutional democracy
Part VI. Conclusions
1. Constitutionalism does not necessarily have to be liberal
2. Illiberal constitutionalism is a deterioration from liberal constitutionalism towards authoritarianism but has not reached that point yet
3. In an illiberal constitutional identity, the liberal and non-liberal or illiberal value orientation of the population can intermittently prevail
4. Illiberal constitutionalism is a coherent theory in its illiberal and weakly constrained manner
5. Lessons learned, mostly, for others ...