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Produktbild: Differential Information Economies
Band 19

Differential Information Economies

Aus der Reihe Studies in Economic Theory

Fr. 242.00

inkl. gesetzl. MwSt., Versandkostenfrei

Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Taschenbuch

Erscheinungsdatum

21.10.2010

Abbildungen

XIV, 650 p.

Herausgeber

Dionysius Glycopantis + weitere

Verlag

Springer Berlin

Seitenzahl

650

Maße (L/B/H)

23.5/15.5/3.7 cm

Gewicht

1007 g

Auflage

Softcover reprint of hardcover 1st ed. 2005

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-3-642-05977-3

Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Taschenbuch

Erscheinungsdatum

21.10.2010

Abbildungen

XIV, 650 p.

Herausgeber

Verlag

Springer Berlin

Seitenzahl

650

Maße (L/B/H)

23.5/15.5/3.7 cm

Gewicht

1007 g

Auflage

Softcover reprint of hardcover 1st ed. 2005

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-3-642-05977-3

Herstelleradresse

Springer-Verlag GmbH
Tiergartenstr. 17
69121 Heidelberg
DE

Email: ProductSafety@springernature.com

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  • Produktbild: Differential Information Economies
  • Equilibrium concepts in differential information economies.- Core Notions, Existence Results.- Information, efficiency, and the core of an economy.- Information, efficiency and the core of an economy: Comments on Wilson’s paper.- The core of an economy with differential information.- An alternative proof of the nonemptiness of the private core.- On the continuity of expected utility.- Market games with differential information and infinite dimensional commodity spaces: the core.- A two-stage core with applications to asset market and differential information economiesw.- Balancedness and the core in economies with asymmetric information.- Core and Walrasian Expectations Equilibrium Equivalence.- Competitive and core allocations in large economies with differential information.- Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies.- Exchange economies with asymmetric information: competitive equilibrium and core.- Core, Pareto Optimality and Incentive Compatibility.- Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information.- Efficiency and incentive compatibility in differential information economies.- Incentives in market games with asymmetric information: the core.- Cooperative interim contract and re-contract: Chandler’s M-form firm.- Optimal multilateral contracts.- Risk aversion and incentive compatibility with ex post information asymmetry.- Ex ante contracting with endogenously determined communication plans.- Incentive compatible contractible information.- Continuity and Stability.- Core concepts in economies where information is almost complete.- On coalitional stability of anonymous interim mechanisms.- Signaling in markets with two-sided adverse selection.- Non-myopiclearning in differential information economies: the core.- Value Allocations and the Bargaining SET.- Cooperative games with incomplete information.- The value allocation of an economy with differential information.- Existence and properties of a value allocation for an economy with differential information.- The bargaining set of a large economy with differential information.- Coalition structure values in differential information economies: Is unity a strength?.- Implementation.- Coalitional Bayesian Nash implementation in differential information economies.- An extensive form interpretation of the private core.- On extensive form implementation of contracts in differential information economies.