Band 29
Rationality in Extensive Form Games
Aus der Reihe
Theory and Decision Library C
-
- Hardcover
- Taschenbuch ausgewählt
- eBook
-
Sprache:Englisch
Fr. 138.00
inkl. gesetzl. MwSt.,
Beschreibung
Produktdetails
Einband
Taschenbuch
Erscheinungsdatum
19.11.2010
Verlag
Springer UsSeitenzahl
242
Maße (L/B/H)
23.5/15.5/1.4 cm
Gewicht
388 g
Auflage
2001
Sprache
Englisch
ISBN
978-1-4419-4918-9
This book is concerned with situations in which several persons reach decisions independently and the final consequence depends, potentially, upon each of the decisions taken. Such situations may be described formally by an extensive form game: a mathematical object which specifies the order in which decisions are to be taken, the information available to the decision makers at each point in time, and the consequence that results for each possible combination of decisions. A necessary requirement for rational behavior in such games is that each decision maker should reach a decision that is optimal, given his preferences over his own decisions. This requirement is far from sufficient, however, since every decision maker should in addition base his preferences upon the conjecture that his opponents will act optimally as well. It is this principle that distinguishes noncooperative game theory from one-person decision theory. The main purpose of emRationality in Extensive Form Games/em is to discuss different formalizations of this principle in extensive form games, such as backward induction, Nash equilibrium, forward induction and rationalizability, under the assumption that the decision makers' preferences are given by subjective expected utility functions. The various formalizations, or rationality criteria, are illustrated by examples, and the relationships among the different criteria are explored.
Noch keine Bewertungen vorhanden
Verfassen Sie die erste Bewertung zu diesem Artikel
Helfen Sie anderen Kundinnen und Kunden durch Ihre Meinung.