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Produktbild: Games, Strategies, and Decision Making

Games, Strategies, and Decision Making

Fr. 153.00

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Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Gebundene Ausgabe

Erscheinungsdatum

19.08.2014

Verlag

Macmillan Education Elt

Seitenzahl

592

Maße (L/B/H)

25.9/20.7/3.6 cm

Gewicht

1517 g

Auflage

2nd edition 2014

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-1-4292-3996-7

Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Gebundene Ausgabe

Erscheinungsdatum

19.08.2014

Verlag

Macmillan Education Elt

Seitenzahl

592

Maße (L/B/H)

25.9/20.7/3.6 cm

Gewicht

1517 g

Auflage

2nd edition 2014

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-1-4292-3996-7

Herstelleradresse

Libri GmbH
Europaallee 1
36244 Bad Hersfeld
DE

Email: gpsr@libri.de

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  • Produktbild: Games, Strategies, and Decision Making

  • PART 1 Constructing A Game
    1 Introduction to Strategic Reasoning
    1.1 Introduction
    1.2 A Sampling of Strategic Situations
    1.3 Whetting Your Appetite: The Game of Concentration
    1.4 Psychological Profile of a Player
    1.5 Playing the Gender Pronoun Game

    2. Building a Model of a Strategic Situation
    2.1 Introduction
    2.2 Extensive Form Games: Perfect Information
    2.3 Extensive Form Games: Imperfect Information
    2.4 What Is a Strategy?
    2.5 Strategic Form Games
    2.6 Moving from the Extensive Form and Strategic Form
    2.7 Going from the Strategic Form to the Extensive Form
    2.8 Common Knowledge
    2.9 A Few More Issues in Modeling Games

    PART 2 Strategic Form Games
    3. Eliminating the Impossible: Solving a Game when Rationality Is Common Knowledge
    3.1 Introduction
    3.2 Solving a Game when Players Are Rational
    3.3 Solving a Game when Players Are Rational and Players Know that Players Are Rational
    3.4 Solving a Game when Rationality Is Common Knowledge
    3.5 Do people believe that people believe that people are rational?
    3.6 Appendix: Strict and Weak Dominance
    3.7 Appendix: Rationalizability (Advanced)
    3.8 Appendix: Strict Dominance with Randomization

    4. Stable Play: Nash Equilibria in Discrete Games with Two or Three Players
    4.1 Defining Nash Equilibrium
    4.2 Classic Two-Player Games
    4.3 The Best-Reply Method
    4.4 Three-Player Games
    4.5 Foundations of Nash Equilibrium
    4.6 Fictitious Play and Convergence to Nash Equilibrium
    4.6 Appendix: Formal Definition of Nash Equilibrium

    5. Stable Play: Nash Equilibria in Discrete n-Player Games
    5.1 Introduction
    5.2 Symmetric Games
    5.3 Asymmetric Games
    5.4 Selecting among Nash Equilibria

    6. Stable Play: Nash Equilibria in Continuous Games
    6.1 Introduction
    6.2 Solving for Nash Equilibria without Calculus
    6.3 Solving for Nash Equilibria with Calculus

    7. Keep 'Em Guessing: Randomized Strategies
    7.1 Police Patrols and the Drug Trade
    7.2 Making Decisions under Uncertainty
    7.3 Mixed Strategies and Nash Equilibrium
    7.4 Examples
    7.5 Advanced Examples
    7.6 Pessimism and Games of Pure Conflict
    7.7 Appendix: Formal Definition of Nash Equilibrium in Mixed Strategies

    PART 3 Extensive Form Games
    8. Taking Turns: Sequential Games with Perfect Information
    8.1 Introduction
    8.2 Backward Induction and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
    8.3 Examples
    8.4 Waiting Games: Preemption and Attrition
    8.5 Do People Reason Using Backward Induction?

    9. Taking Turns in the Dark: Sequential Games with Imperfect Information
    9.1 Introduction
    9.2 Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
    9.3 Examples
    9.4 Commitment
    9.5 Forward Induction

    PART 4 Games of Incomplete Information
    10. I Know Something You Don't Know: Games with Private Information
    10.1 Introduction
    10.2 A Game of Incomplete Information: The Munich Agreement
    10.3 Bayesian Games and Bayes-Nash Equilibrium
    10.4 When All Players Have Private Information: Auctions
    10.5 Voting on Committees and Juries
    10.6 Appendix: Formal Definition of Bayes-Nash Equilibrium
    10.7 Appendix: First-Price, Sealed-Bid Auction with a Continuum of Types

    11. What You Do Tells Me Who You Are: Signaling Games
    11.1 Introduction
    11.2 Perfect Bayes-Nash Equilibrium
    11.3 Examples
    11.4 Selecting Among Perfect Bayes-Nash Equilibria: The Intuitive Criterion
    11.5 Appendix: Bayes's Rule and Updating Beliefs
    11.6 Appendix: Formal Definition of Perfect Bayes-Nash Equilibrium for Signaling Games

    12. Lies and the Lying Liars That Tell Them: Cheap Talk Games
    12.1 Introduction
    12.2 Communication in a Game-Theoretic World
    12.3 Signaling Information
    12.4 Signaling Intentions

    PART 5 Repeated Games
    13. Playing Forever: Repeated Interaction with Infinitely Lived Players
    13.1 Trench Warfare in World War I
    13.2 Constructing a Repeated Game
    13.3 Trench Warfare: Finite Horizon
    13.4 Trench Warfare: Infinite Horizon
    13.5 Some Experimental Evidence for the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
    13.6 Appendix: Present Value of a Payoff Stream
    13.7 Appendix: Dynamic Programming

    14. Cooperation and Reputation: Applications of Repeated Interaction with Infinitely Lived Player
    14.1 Introduction
    14.2 A Menu of Punishments
    14.3 Quid-Pro-Quo
    14.4 Reputation
    14.5 Imperfect Monitoring and Antiballistic Missiles

    15. Interaction in Infinitely Lived Institutions
    15.1 Introductions
    15.2 Cooperation with Overlapping Generations
    15.3 Cooperation in a Large Population

    PART 6 Evolutionary Game Theory
    16. Evolutionary Game Theory and Biology: Evolutionarily Stable Strategies
    16.1 Introducing Evolutionary Game Theory
    16.2 Hawk-Dove Conflict
    16.3 Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
    16.4 Properties of an ESS
    16.5 Multipopulation Games
    16.6 Evolution of Spite

    17. Evolutionary Game Theory and Biology: Replicator Dynamics
    17.1 Introduction
    17.2 Replicator Dynamics and the Hawk-Dove Game
    17.3 General Definition of the Replicator Dynamic
    17.4 ESS and Attractors of the Replicator Dynamic
    17.5 Examples

    Solutions to "Check Your Understanding" Questions
    Glossary
    Index