Money and Banks in the American Political System

'Why are banks politically powerful in the United States? The novel argument of Lavelle's important book is that banks are powerful because they have allies within the American political system that need banks in order to further their own bureaucratic objectives. For example, the Federal Reserve needs banks to help preserve its independence from the Congress, Congress needs banks to help allocate resources to favored constituents (e.g., homeowners), and financial regulators need banks to help preserve their jurisdictions and budgets. Lavelle's exploration of the bureaucratic politics of financial policy making provides a new understanding of regulation, deregulation, innovation, and crises in American finance.' J. Lawrence Broz, University of California, San Diego

'Why are banks politically powerful in the United States? The novel argument of Lavelle's important book is that banks are powerful because they have allies within the American political system that need banks in order to further their own bureaucratic objectives. For example, the Federal Reserve needs banks to help preserve its independence from the Congress, Congress needs banks to help allocate resources to favored constituents (e.g., homeowners), and financial regulators need banks to help preserve their jurisdictions and budgets. Lavelle's exploration of the bureaucratic politics of financial policy making provides a new understanding of regulation, deregulation, innovation, and crises in American finance.' J. Lawrence Broz, University of California, San Diego 'In this concise volume, Professor Lavelle masterfully dissects and evaluates the politics and institutional drivers of America's evolving banking system. A must-read for political scientists and lawyers alike.' Chris Brummer, Georgetown University 'Lavelle's book usefully illuminates how politically created fragmentation of financial regulation in the United States creates the conditions for recurrent crises. She fills in a huge lacuna in the literature on financial regulation by shifting attention from its effects to its origins and real-world operation in the interaction of Congress and the regulatory agencies.' Herman Schwartz, University of Virginia