Volume 3: PART III THE PROBLEM OF THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL (THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS) Section I PRELIMINARY CRITICAL QUESTIONS I. THE CONNECTIONS OF THE PROBLEM II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM Section II THE CAUSAL ANTINOMY PACE IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF KANT'S SOLUTION V. DETERMIN ISM AND INDETERMINISM VI. DETERMINISM, CAUSAL AND FINALISTIC VII. ONTOLOGICAL REGULARITY AS THE BASIS OF FREEDOM Section III THE ANTINOMY OF THE OUGHT VIII. CRITICISM OF THE KANTIAN DOCTRINE OF FREEDOM X. THE' PRESENT STATE OF THE PROBLEM Section IV ETHICAL PHENOMENA, THEIR EFFICACY AS PROOFS XI. PROOFS OF METAPHYSICAL OBJECTS XII. MORAL JUDGMENT AND THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF SELF-DETERMINATION XIII. RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY XIV. THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT XV. SUPPLEMENTARY GROUPS OF FACTS XVI. OUGHT AND THE WILL Section V ONTOLOGICAL POSSIBILITY OF PERSONAL FREEDOM XVII. AUTONOMY OF THE PERSON AND DETERMINATION OF VALUES XVIII. SOLUTION OF THE OUGHT-ANTINOMY XIX. PROBLEMS STILL UNSOLVED Section VI APPENDIX TO THE DOCTRINE OF FREEDOM CHAPTER XX. APPARENT AND REAL DEFECTS OF THE THEORY XXI. ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, INDEX.
