Introduction: Logico-Semantics, Logical Positivism and their Discontents
Chapter One: The Classical Empiricist Account of Meaning
1.1: The Inessentiality of language
1.2: The "'Idea' Idea"
1.3: The Primacy of the Naming Relation
1.4: The Linguistic Turn, Anti-Psychologism, and the Primacy of the Sentence
1.5: Logical Analysis
Chapter Two: Classical Empiricism and the Problem of the A Priori: Mill, Kant, and Frege
2.1: Some Background Distinctions: A Priori/A Posteriori, Analytic/Synthetic, Necessary/Contingent
2.2: Mill
2.3: Kant
2.4: Frege
2.5: Appendix: Russell's Set-Theoretic Paradox
Chapter Three: Frege's Begriffsschrift
3.1: Logic and its Limitations
3.2: Function and Argument
3.3: Predicates, Quantifiers and the Solution to the Problem of Multiple Generality
3.4: Sentence Connectives and the Solution to the Problem of a Unified Logical Notation
3.5: Identity
3.6: Appendix: Concordance between Begriffsschrift Notation and the Kalish/Montague/Mar Notation
Chapter Four: Frege on Sense and Reference
4.1: Three Semantic Puzzles for a Reference-Only (Extensionalist) Account of Meaning
4.2: The Sense/Reference Distinction
4.3: The Problems of Non-Referring Singular Terms and Identity Statements
4.4: The Problem of Belief Contexts
4.5: Problems with Frege's Solution
4.6: Definite Descriptions and Some Further Consequences of Frege's Sense/Reference Distinction
Chapter Five: Russell's Theory of Descriptions
5.1: Scope and Basic Strategy of the Theory of Descriptions
5.2: The Theory Applied to Definite Descriptions, including Non-Referring Definite Descriptions
5.3: Four Key Features of Russell's Analysis of Definite Descriptions
5.4: Russell's Solutions to Some Semantic Puzzles
5.5: Russell's Theory and Excluded Middle
5.6: Critical Discussion (I): Strawson
5.7: Critical Discussion (II): Donnellan
Chapter Six: Kripke's Causal Theory of Reference
6.1: Core Features of Russell's Theory
6.2: Three Key Problems for Russell's Description Theory
6.3: The Cluster Theory and its Analogous Problems
6.4: Correct Descriptions are neither Necessary nor Sufficient for Names to Refer
6.5: The Causal Theory of Reference-Grounding and Reference-Borrowing
6.6: The Causal Theory's Solution to the Three Problems
6.7: Rigid Designation and Necessary A Posteriori Propositions
6.8: The Distinction between Fixing the Reference and Giving the Meaning
6.9: The Contingency of 'Hesperus is the evening star' v. The Necessity of 'Hesperus is Phosphorus'
6.10: Problems for Kripke's View
Chapter Seven: Logical Positivism I: Ayer
7.1: Three Central Doctrines of Logical Positivism
7.2: Realist v. Anti-Realist Accounts of Meaning
7.3: Versions of the Verification Principle
7.4: The Problem of the A Priori (again)
7.5: Questions regarding Conventionalism about Necessity and Logic
Chapter Eight: Logical Positivism II: Carnap
8.1: Conventionalism
8.2: Linguistic Frameworks
8.3: Internal v. External Questions and Formal v. Material Mode
8.4: Metaphysics and Tolerance
8.5: The Status of Philosophy
Chapter Nine: Quine's Critique of Positivism I: 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism'
9.1: 'No Entity without Identity'
9.2: Two Different Conceptions of Synonymy: Definition and Substitution
9.3: Epistemic Holism and the Rejection of Meaning and Synonymy
9.4: Epistemic Holism and the Elimination of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction
9.5: Epistemic Holism and the Web of Belief
9.6: Epistemic Holism, Fallibilism and the History of Science
Chapter Ten: Quine's Critique of Positivism II: Anti-Conventionalism
10.1: Quine's Problems with Conventionalism
10.2: Quine's Pragmatic Account of Logic and Necessity
10.3: Problems with Quine's Pragmatization of Logic: Dummett and Davidson
Chapter Eleven: Quine: Radical Translation and the Indeterminacy of Meaning
11.1: Occasion Sentences, Standing Sentences, Stimulus Meaning, and Stimulus Synonymy
11.2: The Argument for Indeterminacy: Holism and Behaviorism
11.3: First-Personal and Ontological Indeterminacy v. Third-Personal and Epistemological Under-Determination
11.4: The Principle of Charity: Pragmatic or Constitutive
11.5: Some Problems with Charity and Logic.
Chapter Twelve: Later-Wittgenstein I: Ordinary Language Philosophy and the Critique of Ostension
12.1: Ordinary Language Philosophy, Grammatical Investigations and Language Games
12.2: The Critique of the Augustinian Picture: The Language Games of the Grocer and the Builders
12.3: Wittgenstein's Critique of Ostensive Definition
Chapter Thirteen: Later-Wittgenstein II: The Rule-Following Considerations
13.1: The Problem of Meaning Scepticism
13.2: Algorithms and Dispositions
13.3: Kripke's Interpretation of Wittgenstein: Community Dispositionalism and the 'Sceptical Solution'
13.4: Textual Evidence For and Against Kripke's Interpretation of Wittgenstein
13.5: Normatively-Rich Practices: Sociality
13.6: Normatively-Rich Practices: Contextualism and Fallibilism
Chapter Fourteen: Later-Wittgenstein III: The Private Language Argument
14.1: The Relation between the Rule-Following Discussion and the Private Language Argument
14.2: The 'Independent Check' Argument
14.3: The Independent Check Argument Evaluated: Ayer's Objection and Kripke's Footnote 47
14.4: The Grammatical Status of Two Statements of Privacy
14.5: The Expressive (Not Descriptive) Grammar of Sensation Talk
14.6: Wittgenstein and Behaviorism
