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Band 13023

Algorithmic Decision Theory 7th International Conference, ADT 2021, Toulouse, France, November 3–5, 2021, Proceedings

Aus der Reihe Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence

Fr. 112.00

inkl. gesetzl. MwSt., Versandkostenfrei

Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Taschenbuch

Erscheinungsdatum

07.10.2021

Herausgeber

Dimitris Fotakis + weitere

Verlag

Springer

Seitenzahl

441

Maße (L/B/H)

23.5/15.5/2.5 cm

Gewicht

698 g

Auflage

1st edition 2021

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-3-030-87755-2

Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Taschenbuch

Erscheinungsdatum

07.10.2021

Herausgeber

Verlag

Springer

Seitenzahl

441

Maße (L/B/H)

23.5/15.5/2.5 cm

Gewicht

698 g

Auflage

1st edition 2021

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-3-030-87755-2

Herstelleradresse

Springer-Verlag KG
Sachsenplatz 4-6
1201 Wien
AT

Email: GPSR Kontakt

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  • Produktbild: Algorithmic Decision Theory
  • Produktbild: Algorithmic Decision Theory

  • Computational Social Choice and Preference Modelling.- Aggregating Preferences Represented by Conditional Preference Networks.- Measuring Nearly Single-peakedness of an Electorate: Some New Insights.- Preference Aggregation in the Generalised Unavailable Candidate Model.- Simultaneous Elicitation of Scoring Rule and Agent Preferences for Robust Winner Determination.- Preference Elicitation.- Incremental elicitation of preferences: optimist or pessimist?.- Probabilistic Lexicographic Preference Trees.- Incremental Preference Elicitation with Bipolar Choquet Integrals.- Preference Aggregation and Voting.- In the Beginning There Were n Agents: Founding and Amending a Constitution.- Unveiling the Truth in Liquid Democracy with Misinformed Voters.- Computing Kemeny Rankings From d-Euclidean Preferences.- Iterative Deliberation via Metric Aggregation.- Manipulation in Voting.- Obvious Manipulability of Voting Rules.- Manipulation in Communication Structures of Graph-Restricted Weighted Voting Games.- Strategic Voting in Negotiating Teams.- The Nonmanipulative Vote-Deficits of Voting Rules.- Fair Division and Resource Allocation.- Allocating Indivisible Items with Minimum Dissatisfaction on Preference Graphs.- On Fairness via Picking Sequences in Allocation of Indivisible Goods.- On Reachable Assignments in Cycles.- Minimizing and balancing envy among agents using Ordered Weighted Average.- Algorithmic Decision Theory.- Interactive Optimization of Submodular Functions under Matroid Constraints.- Necessary and possible interaction in a 2-maxitive Sugeno integral model.- Coalition Formation.- Democratic Forking: Choosing Sides with Social Choice.- Hedonic Diversity Games Revisited.- Stable Matchings.- Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning for Decentralized Stable Matching.- Lazy Gale-Shapley for Many-to-One Matching with Partial Information.- Participatory Budgeting.- Participatory Funding Coordination: Model, Axioms and Rules.- Complexity of Manipulative Interference in Participatory Budgeting.